While the US President Donald Trump's reasons and legality for striking Iran are tenuous there are some clear and present dangers that many people are ignoring.
It can reasonably be argued that Trump launched his military action in contravention of 'international law'. He did not seek prior approval from Congress or the Senate, nor did he consult other allies, except Israel with who it took part.
His reason however, is that Iran was nearing completion of building a nuclear bomb, and decisive military action was needed to eliminate the threat from the Islamic state.
Trump, nor indeed Israel, has failed to present 'proof' that Iran was close to developing a nuclear bomb. And this has left many allies reluctant to offer military support despite the effects on the flow of oil from the region that has resulted from Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
However, what cannot be disputed is that Iran has, for a long time, been developing projects which has produced significant quantities of 60% enriched Uranium 235.
The evidence for this lies with the International Atomic Energy Authority [IAEA] which calculated in its September 2025 verification and monitoring report that on the eve of the June 2025 attacks by Israel and the United States, Iran possessed 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% of the explosive uranium isotope, U-235 [Arms Control Center / IAEA PDF]
Fearing that Iran was weeks if not days away from 90% weapons grade enrichment, the US launched a series of strikes aimed at sites where it was believed Iran was storing or enriching such materials.
On the 22nd June 2025, the United States Air Force and Navy attacked three nuclear facilities in Iran as part of the Twelve-Day War, under the code name Operation Midnight Hammer. The Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center were all targeted with fourteen GBU-57A/B MOP "bunker buster" bombs carried by B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, and Tomahawk missiles fired from a submarine.
Concerns grew over the weeks following the attacks that Iran may have moved some of their precious Uranium. Satellite pictures published later appeared to show lorries queueing at Fordow leading to speculation that Iran's enriched Uranium may have been moved to various secret locations around the country.
While the White House stated in June 2025 that there was no sign it was moved prior to the strikes with top officials suggesting it was buried under rubble, many news outlets raised concerns that Iran might have saved its nuclear material.
The Telegraph [Paywalled] reported in June 2025 that satellite images showed lines of trucks at Fordow before the US strikes, with analysts suggesting materials were frantically moved.
Other reports suggested the surgical strikes failed to completely destroy Iran's stockpiles and core components of the country's nuclear program and likely only set it back by months [CNN].
And even if the facilities had been destroyed there were suggestions that Iran could retrieve the material buried under the rubble [BBC / NYT].
Such reports are supposition and cannot be independently verified. But even a small amount of nuclear material could pose a deadly threat to Iran's sworn enemies.
The big question on many people's minds is whether the US had actionable intelligence to warrant its military action against Iran.
The concern too is whether Iran was or still is pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran claims it isn't and that all nuclear research is for peaceful purposes, such as medical research or energy creation.
However, given the continued rhetoric over the years and statements suggesting it might develop a weapon should it be attacked, the fear is that Iran was already developing a weapon, or worse already developed and produced one.
Taking it as fact that Iran was seeking to develop a nuclear bomb, and that it still has at least some of the 440kg of 60% enriched U-235, how much of a threat is Iran following Operation Midnight Hammer and the more recent ad ongoing Operation Epic Fury?
It is widely believed that to build a viable nuclear bomb, one needs U-235 enriched to 90%. While many bombs created use highly enriched U-235, often referred to as 'weapons grade uranium', it is in fact possible to build a bomb with U-235 as low as 20% enriched.
Take at least 780 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium 235, slam two non-critical mass chunks of them together in a gun type assembly and you have a crude nuclear bomb.
The more enriched, the less fissionable material is needed. Moreover, after you've surpassed the hurdle of amassing the U-235 the making of a viable device is relatively simple.
While most modern nuclear bombs are extremely complex in order to promote a high yield device, the first nuclear bombs were relatively simple 'Gun-type' weapons.
In basic terms this requires sending a chunk of U-235 at high speed down a tube toward another chunk of U-235.
With regard to the risk of proliferation and use by terrorists, the relatively simple design is a concern, as it does not require as much fine engineering or manufacturing as other methods. With enough highly enriched uranium, nations or groups with relatively low levels of technological sophistication could create an inefficient - though still quite powerful - gun-type nuclear weapon.
Conventional thinking is that no-one would make a weapon with anything below 90% enrichment because the bomb would be too cumbersome.
Uranium must have a minimum of 20% U-235 in it in order to be useful in making a nuclear bomb. However, a bomb made with uranium at this minimum level of enrichment would be too huge to deliver, requiring huge amounts of uranium and even larger amounts of conventional explosives in order to compress it into a supercritical mass. In practice, uranium containing at least 90% U-235 has been used to make nuclear weapons. Material with this level of enrichment is called highly enriched uranium or HEU. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, was made with approximately 60 kilograms of HEU. Highly enriched uranium is also used in research reactors and naval reactors, such as those that power aircraft carriers and submarines. The HEU fuel meant for research reactors is considered particularly vulnerable to diversion for use in nuclear weapons [IEER PDF].
As little as 40 kg of 60%-enriched uranium can be used to build a crude nuclear weapon with a kiloton yield. While too large to fit on a missile, such a weapon could be delivered by shipping container.
Given Iran has [or at least had in June 2025] an estimated 440 kg of 60% enriched U-235 it could conceivably make ten 1 kt bombs.
Loaded into shipping containers and exploding in major cities around the globe, the shock to the global economy and world order would be more catastrophic than the potential physical damage.
A 1-kiloton (kt) nuclear ground burst in London would cause severe localized damage, creating a crater and immediate lethal radiation zone within a few hundred meters, with moderate structural damage extending up to 1 kilometer. The immediate blast radius would be relatively small compared to the city's size, but radioactive fallout would pose a significant hazard [Arxiv].
Such scenarios are dismissed by many as being far-fetched and the stuff of Hollywood movies such as the Sum of All Fears. But fundamentalist, radical terror states have already been seen to carry out major atrocities.
Terror attacks by fundamentalist groups in the past three decades seen planes flown into buildings, trains and buses blown up or crowds targeted with vehicles used as weapons. The use of a nuclear weapon is not beyond the realms of possibilities.
But there are other just as nightmarish threats from Iran's possession of nuclear material. Even if it cannot assemble a nuclear bomb Iran possesses the technical expertise and access to many radioactive isotopes, such as Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60 from medical/industrial sectors, to develop radiological dispersal devices. Some analysts suggest Iran might employ these through proxies such as Hezbollah or the Houthis for plausible deniability.
There are growing concerns that it could use what nuclear material it can salvage to construct a number of so-called 'dirty bombs', or radiological dispersal devices [Remm].
In the same way a small 1 kt nuclear bomb would not cause much physical damage, an RDD is designed less for mass destruction and more for contamination, disruption, and psychological impact.
Such concerns have long existed with many nations having conducted exercises to determine how they might identify or deal with such an event.
In London, around 20 years ago, part of the financial district was sealed off as authorities conducted several counter-terrorism exercises in the city to prepare for potential chemical, biological, or radiological attacks, including scenarios involving a "dirty bomb" or RDD [Guardian]. No similar exercises have taken place since.
An RDD attack is unlikely to kill large numbers of people in a short time. The problem instead is a potential cancer timebomb hanging over the affected area for a generation [BBC].
Clean-up would cost millions of pounds, but the perceived threat could linger even after authorities declare the area safe. Should such a device be placed in the centre of a major city it could arguably kill the economy of that city. Tourists would be unlikely to visit for years, workers would insist on relocation, and transport infrastructure would be decimated, cutting off links between parts of the city.
Delivery of such a weapon could be carried out in any number of ways. One threat is via missile. It is now widely believed that Iran has the capability of hitting any European country.
It is unknown what stockpiles Iran still possesses after three weeks of US bombing, but its inventory prior to Operation Epic Fury was far more extensive than most people realize [Iran Watch]. Media reports indicate growing concerns that Iran could resort to using a 'dirty bomb' [India Today / e-arc].
Iran's capability may of course be severely degraded, as the US president maintains. But there is another concern should Israel or the US hit the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, either deliberately or accidentally. Indeed there have already been some strikes close to the plant [Al Jazeera].
Any strike, deliberate or accidental, would result in the release of radioactive material. Given the prevailing wind patterns and maritime conditions in the Gulf, contamination would almost certainly drift westward, potentially affecting population centres and critical infrastructure across Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait.
As seen following Chernobyl and more recently, Fukushima, the regional consequences of a nuclear 'accident' would be significant and long-lasting.
There is another serious and overlooked threat. That is Iran's chemical weapons capability [Telegraph paywalled].
Although Iran is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and has formally renounced the development and possession of chemical weapons, it has faced international scrutiny regarding potential covert chemical capabilities [FDD].
There are many - critical of the US and Israel - that have suggested military action is only likely to antagonise Iran into retaliation and that it would be unlikely to make a first strike deployment, be it with conventional, chemical or nuclear weapons.
The behaviour of Iran over the years would suggest otherwise.
It has since the 1979 Islamic revolution funded proxy terror group including, but not confined to, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has engaged in a sustained campaign of violence, terrorism, and clandestine operations against Western nations, primarily targeting the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, alongside Israeli interests. Using the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] and proxies such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, Tehran has conducted embassy bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and assassination plots.
Key Attacks and Operations (1979–Present)
1979–1981: U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis: Iranian students, backed by the new regime, took 66 Americans hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for 444 days.
1983: Beirut Bombings: Hezbollah, with Iranian support, bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (63 dead) and the Marine barracks (241 U.S. service personnel killed).
1984: CIA Station Chief Kidnapping: Hezbollah kidnapped CIA Station Chief William Buckley in Beirut, who was later tortured and killed.
1985: TWA Flight 847 Hijacking: Hezbollah hijacked a flight from Athens to Rome, murdering a U.S. Navy diver on board.
1985–1986: Paris Attacks: Hezbollah agents carried out a series of bombings in Paris, killing 20 people and wounding hundreds.
1996: Khobar Towers Bombing: Iran-backed Hezbollah Al-Hijaz bombed a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. airmen.
2003–2011: Iraq War Proxies: Iran provided explosives (EFPs) and training to Shia militias in Iraq, which killed hundreds of U.S. and coalition troops.
2011: Washington D.C. Assassination Plot: The US foiled an IRGC plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington.
2012: Burgas Bus Bombing: Hezbollah bombed a bus of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria, killing 6 people.
2019: Saudi Aramco Strikes: Attacks on Saudi oil facilities, widely attributed to Iran, caused major disruptions to global energy supplies.
2020: U.S. Base Attacks: Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Iran launched ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq, causing brain injuries to over 100 U.S. personnel.
2024-2026: Ongoing Threats: Iran has escalated its use of criminal proxies to target Israeli and American interests in Europe and the UK. In early 2026, amid intense regional conflict, Iran was linked to over 20 potentially lethal attacks on UK soil [FDD / Wikipedia].
While there is some legitimacy to take the decision to wage against the rogue state, reasons and focuses keep changing. At first Trump appeared to point to regime change, but soon focused on the nuclear threat that Iran posed. As the war continued into its third week and Iran essentially closed the Strait of Hormuz, the war threatened the flow of oil. As this threatens to trigger an global energy crisis, a slump in food production as fertilisers become unavailable and the risk of a global recession grows, Trump appears to have little if any plan as to how to proceed.
He claims to have forced Iran to the negotiating table but described Iran's negotiators as strange. Meanwhile, Iran have insisted they are not negotiating with the US. And in the meantime missiles continue to rain down across the region with no apparent end in sight, and with a growing risk the whole region could go up in flames. Worse still, the war could spread to other parts of the world with lone wolf terror attacks and growing economic fallout.
tvnewswatch, London,UK
It can reasonably be argued that Trump launched his military action in contravention of 'international law'. He did not seek prior approval from Congress or the Senate, nor did he consult other allies, except Israel with who it took part.
His reason however, is that Iran was nearing completion of building a nuclear bomb, and decisive military action was needed to eliminate the threat from the Islamic state.
Trump, nor indeed Israel, has failed to present 'proof' that Iran was close to developing a nuclear bomb. And this has left many allies reluctant to offer military support despite the effects on the flow of oil from the region that has resulted from Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
However, what cannot be disputed is that Iran has, for a long time, been developing projects which has produced significant quantities of 60% enriched Uranium 235.
The evidence for this lies with the International Atomic Energy Authority [IAEA] which calculated in its September 2025 verification and monitoring report that on the eve of the June 2025 attacks by Israel and the United States, Iran possessed 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% of the explosive uranium isotope, U-235 [Arms Control Center / IAEA PDF]
Fearing that Iran was weeks if not days away from 90% weapons grade enrichment, the US launched a series of strikes aimed at sites where it was believed Iran was storing or enriching such materials.
On the 22nd June 2025, the United States Air Force and Navy attacked three nuclear facilities in Iran as part of the Twelve-Day War, under the code name Operation Midnight Hammer. The Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center were all targeted with fourteen GBU-57A/B MOP "bunker buster" bombs carried by B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, and Tomahawk missiles fired from a submarine.
Concerns grew over the weeks following the attacks that Iran may have moved some of their precious Uranium. Satellite pictures published later appeared to show lorries queueing at Fordow leading to speculation that Iran's enriched Uranium may have been moved to various secret locations around the country.
While the White House stated in June 2025 that there was no sign it was moved prior to the strikes with top officials suggesting it was buried under rubble, many news outlets raised concerns that Iran might have saved its nuclear material.
The Telegraph [Paywalled] reported in June 2025 that satellite images showed lines of trucks at Fordow before the US strikes, with analysts suggesting materials were frantically moved.
Other reports suggested the surgical strikes failed to completely destroy Iran's stockpiles and core components of the country's nuclear program and likely only set it back by months [CNN].
And even if the facilities had been destroyed there were suggestions that Iran could retrieve the material buried under the rubble [BBC / NYT].
Such reports are supposition and cannot be independently verified. But even a small amount of nuclear material could pose a deadly threat to Iran's sworn enemies.
The big question on many people's minds is whether the US had actionable intelligence to warrant its military action against Iran.
The concern too is whether Iran was or still is pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon. Iran claims it isn't and that all nuclear research is for peaceful purposes, such as medical research or energy creation.
However, given the continued rhetoric over the years and statements suggesting it might develop a weapon should it be attacked, the fear is that Iran was already developing a weapon, or worse already developed and produced one.
Taking it as fact that Iran was seeking to develop a nuclear bomb, and that it still has at least some of the 440kg of 60% enriched U-235, how much of a threat is Iran following Operation Midnight Hammer and the more recent ad ongoing Operation Epic Fury?
It is widely believed that to build a viable nuclear bomb, one needs U-235 enriched to 90%. While many bombs created use highly enriched U-235, often referred to as 'weapons grade uranium', it is in fact possible to build a bomb with U-235 as low as 20% enriched.
Take at least 780 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium 235, slam two non-critical mass chunks of them together in a gun type assembly and you have a crude nuclear bomb.
The more enriched, the less fissionable material is needed. Moreover, after you've surpassed the hurdle of amassing the U-235 the making of a viable device is relatively simple.
While most modern nuclear bombs are extremely complex in order to promote a high yield device, the first nuclear bombs were relatively simple 'Gun-type' weapons.
In basic terms this requires sending a chunk of U-235 at high speed down a tube toward another chunk of U-235.
With regard to the risk of proliferation and use by terrorists, the relatively simple design is a concern, as it does not require as much fine engineering or manufacturing as other methods. With enough highly enriched uranium, nations or groups with relatively low levels of technological sophistication could create an inefficient - though still quite powerful - gun-type nuclear weapon.
Conventional thinking is that no-one would make a weapon with anything below 90% enrichment because the bomb would be too cumbersome.
Uranium must have a minimum of 20% U-235 in it in order to be useful in making a nuclear bomb. However, a bomb made with uranium at this minimum level of enrichment would be too huge to deliver, requiring huge amounts of uranium and even larger amounts of conventional explosives in order to compress it into a supercritical mass. In practice, uranium containing at least 90% U-235 has been used to make nuclear weapons. Material with this level of enrichment is called highly enriched uranium or HEU. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, was made with approximately 60 kilograms of HEU. Highly enriched uranium is also used in research reactors and naval reactors, such as those that power aircraft carriers and submarines. The HEU fuel meant for research reactors is considered particularly vulnerable to diversion for use in nuclear weapons [IEER PDF].
As little as 40 kg of 60%-enriched uranium can be used to build a crude nuclear weapon with a kiloton yield. While too large to fit on a missile, such a weapon could be delivered by shipping container.
Given Iran has [or at least had in June 2025] an estimated 440 kg of 60% enriched U-235 it could conceivably make ten 1 kt bombs.
Loaded into shipping containers and exploding in major cities around the globe, the shock to the global economy and world order would be more catastrophic than the potential physical damage.
A 1-kiloton (kt) nuclear ground burst in London would cause severe localized damage, creating a crater and immediate lethal radiation zone within a few hundred meters, with moderate structural damage extending up to 1 kilometer. The immediate blast radius would be relatively small compared to the city's size, but radioactive fallout would pose a significant hazard [Arxiv].
Such scenarios are dismissed by many as being far-fetched and the stuff of Hollywood movies such as the Sum of All Fears. But fundamentalist, radical terror states have already been seen to carry out major atrocities.
Terror attacks by fundamentalist groups in the past three decades seen planes flown into buildings, trains and buses blown up or crowds targeted with vehicles used as weapons. The use of a nuclear weapon is not beyond the realms of possibilities.
But there are other just as nightmarish threats from Iran's possession of nuclear material. Even if it cannot assemble a nuclear bomb Iran possesses the technical expertise and access to many radioactive isotopes, such as Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60 from medical/industrial sectors, to develop radiological dispersal devices. Some analysts suggest Iran might employ these through proxies such as Hezbollah or the Houthis for plausible deniability.
There are growing concerns that it could use what nuclear material it can salvage to construct a number of so-called 'dirty bombs', or radiological dispersal devices [Remm].
In the same way a small 1 kt nuclear bomb would not cause much physical damage, an RDD is designed less for mass destruction and more for contamination, disruption, and psychological impact.
Such concerns have long existed with many nations having conducted exercises to determine how they might identify or deal with such an event.
In London, around 20 years ago, part of the financial district was sealed off as authorities conducted several counter-terrorism exercises in the city to prepare for potential chemical, biological, or radiological attacks, including scenarios involving a "dirty bomb" or RDD [Guardian]. No similar exercises have taken place since.
An RDD attack is unlikely to kill large numbers of people in a short time. The problem instead is a potential cancer timebomb hanging over the affected area for a generation [BBC].
Clean-up would cost millions of pounds, but the perceived threat could linger even after authorities declare the area safe. Should such a device be placed in the centre of a major city it could arguably kill the economy of that city. Tourists would be unlikely to visit for years, workers would insist on relocation, and transport infrastructure would be decimated, cutting off links between parts of the city.
Delivery of such a weapon could be carried out in any number of ways. One threat is via missile. It is now widely believed that Iran has the capability of hitting any European country.
It is unknown what stockpiles Iran still possesses after three weeks of US bombing, but its inventory prior to Operation Epic Fury was far more extensive than most people realize [Iran Watch]. Media reports indicate growing concerns that Iran could resort to using a 'dirty bomb' [India Today / e-arc].
Iran's capability may of course be severely degraded, as the US president maintains. But there is another concern should Israel or the US hit the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, either deliberately or accidentally. Indeed there have already been some strikes close to the plant [Al Jazeera].
Any strike, deliberate or accidental, would result in the release of radioactive material. Given the prevailing wind patterns and maritime conditions in the Gulf, contamination would almost certainly drift westward, potentially affecting population centres and critical infrastructure across Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait.
As seen following Chernobyl and more recently, Fukushima, the regional consequences of a nuclear 'accident' would be significant and long-lasting.
There is another serious and overlooked threat. That is Iran's chemical weapons capability [Telegraph paywalled].
Although Iran is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and has formally renounced the development and possession of chemical weapons, it has faced international scrutiny regarding potential covert chemical capabilities [FDD].
There are many - critical of the US and Israel - that have suggested military action is only likely to antagonise Iran into retaliation and that it would be unlikely to make a first strike deployment, be it with conventional, chemical or nuclear weapons.
The behaviour of Iran over the years would suggest otherwise.
It has since the 1979 Islamic revolution funded proxy terror group including, but not confined to, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has engaged in a sustained campaign of violence, terrorism, and clandestine operations against Western nations, primarily targeting the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, alongside Israeli interests. Using the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] and proxies such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, Tehran has conducted embassy bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and assassination plots.
Key Attacks and Operations (1979–Present)
1979–1981: U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis: Iranian students, backed by the new regime, took 66 Americans hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for 444 days.
1983: Beirut Bombings: Hezbollah, with Iranian support, bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (63 dead) and the Marine barracks (241 U.S. service personnel killed).
1984: CIA Station Chief Kidnapping: Hezbollah kidnapped CIA Station Chief William Buckley in Beirut, who was later tortured and killed.
1985: TWA Flight 847 Hijacking: Hezbollah hijacked a flight from Athens to Rome, murdering a U.S. Navy diver on board.
1985–1986: Paris Attacks: Hezbollah agents carried out a series of bombings in Paris, killing 20 people and wounding hundreds.
1996: Khobar Towers Bombing: Iran-backed Hezbollah Al-Hijaz bombed a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. airmen.
2003–2011: Iraq War Proxies: Iran provided explosives (EFPs) and training to Shia militias in Iraq, which killed hundreds of U.S. and coalition troops.
2011: Washington D.C. Assassination Plot: The US foiled an IRGC plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington.
2012: Burgas Bus Bombing: Hezbollah bombed a bus of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria, killing 6 people.
2019: Saudi Aramco Strikes: Attacks on Saudi oil facilities, widely attributed to Iran, caused major disruptions to global energy supplies.
2020: U.S. Base Attacks: Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Iran launched ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq, causing brain injuries to over 100 U.S. personnel.
2024-2026: Ongoing Threats: Iran has escalated its use of criminal proxies to target Israeli and American interests in Europe and the UK. In early 2026, amid intense regional conflict, Iran was linked to over 20 potentially lethal attacks on UK soil [FDD / Wikipedia].
While there is some legitimacy to take the decision to wage against the rogue state, reasons and focuses keep changing. At first Trump appeared to point to regime change, but soon focused on the nuclear threat that Iran posed. As the war continued into its third week and Iran essentially closed the Strait of Hormuz, the war threatened the flow of oil. As this threatens to trigger an global energy crisis, a slump in food production as fertilisers become unavailable and the risk of a global recession grows, Trump appears to have little if any plan as to how to proceed.
He claims to have forced Iran to the negotiating table but described Iran's negotiators as strange. Meanwhile, Iran have insisted they are not negotiating with the US. And in the meantime missiles continue to rain down across the region with no apparent end in sight, and with a growing risk the whole region could go up in flames. Worse still, the war could spread to other parts of the world with lone wolf terror attacks and growing economic fallout.
tvnewswatch, London,UK
